Pakistan's previous envoy to the US at the season of the receptacle Laden attack recounts a VERY diverse story than Seymour Hersh, Pakistan's represetative to the US at the season of the Osama canister Laden strike in May 2011 says that Seymour Hersh "unmistakably does not know how Pakistan functions."
In a commentary for Foreign Policy, Husain Haqqani states that the investigative columnist's form of occasions in regards to Pakistan's part in and learning of the attack "just don't make any sense."
Indeed, even thus, Haqqani's form of occasions, alongside his touchy position advancing Islamabad's hobbies in Washington at the season of receptacle Laden's passing, brings up charming issues about what really happened in Abottabad.
In a greatly talked about 10,000-word London Review of Books article, Hersh reported that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence office (ISI) was harboring canister Laden for a long time before a Pakistani defector strolled into the American international safe haven in Islamabad and surrendered the area of al Qaeda's pioneer in return for a large portion of a $25 million US compensate.
The strike, Hersh claims, was not an one-sided secret operation. Rather, it was completely upheld by Pakistan's armed force leader, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, and the leader of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha — however simply because the US debilitated to uncover that they'd been shielding canister Laden on the off chance that they didn't cooperate.Biden (L), alongside individuals from the national security group, get a report on the mission against Osama container Laden in the Situation Room of the White House, May 1, 2011.
This story, Haqqani claims, "verges on dream," since in the previous minister's perspective, Hersh offers no practical clarification for why Pakistan's officers would oblige the strike without needing a credit for their part.
"On the off chance that a reserved alcove arrangement had been arranged to secure Pakistani participation in the attack on Abbottabad consequently for US hush, the ISI would have requested some heavenliness for its collaboration," Haqqani composes. "Encouraging the assault, as described by Hersh, would have given Pakistan's military and ISI a chance to vindicate themselves in American eyes."
My guidelines were clear"
Haqqani accentuates there is no proof that the ISI thought about the container Laden assault.
"Nothing in the behavior of Generals Kayani and Pasha (both of whom later constrained me to leave as minister) implied at their plot with the US in the Abbottabad assault," Haqqani composes.
He likewise contends that Kayani and Pasha were humiliated and needed to "guarantee that there would be no backlashes against Pakistan over affirmations of authority complicity secluded from everything container Laden."
That is the place Haqqani's extraordinary position became an integral factor. He says he was en route back to Islamabad when the assault happened on May 2, 2011, and his bosses sent him back to DC promptly to do harm control.
"My directions were clear: to guarantee that the US government, Congress, and the media did not point the finger at Pakistan's administration, military, or insight administrations for permitting Osama canister Laden's vicinity in the nation, as that would have been an infringement of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373," Haqqani composes. "My supervisors, both regular citizen and military, were clearly worried that Pakistan would be berated."
So who harbored canister Laden?
Haqqani surrenders that it is clear somebody in Pakistan shielded container Laden from 2006 to 2011. The inquiry is whether container Laden's defenders were working inside of Pakistan's administration and security administrations — and assuming this is the case, which piece of it.
Hersh, as far as it matters for him, refers to the work of New York Times reporter Carlotta Gall, who wrote in March 2014 that, as indicated by a Pakistani official, "the United States had direct proof that the ISI boss, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, knew of Bin Laden's vicinity in Abbottabad."
This week, Gall composed that she "gained from an abnormal state individual from the Pakistani knowledge benefit that the ISI had been concealing container Laden and ran a work area particularly to handle him as an insight asset."Haqqani says he asked for a full investigation into for what valid reason Pakistani knowledge administrations were not ready to discover canister Laden in its own particular patio. He never heard back. In any case, he includes that the Obama organization did not push Islamabad to answer addresses about receptacle Laden's life in Pakistan.
Haqqani infers that "the disappointment of both Washington and Islamabad to reveal a more finish comprehension of what happened in the years paving the way to the attack" prompted conspiratorial stories like Hersh's.
While it would be useful for general society to think about container Laden's bolster organize in Pakistan, Haqqani keeps in touch with, it "may not be in either Islamabad's or Washington's enthusiasm to wake resting mut
In a commentary for Foreign Policy, Husain Haqqani states that the investigative columnist's form of occasions in regards to Pakistan's part in and learning of the attack "just don't make any sense."
Indeed, even thus, Haqqani's form of occasions, alongside his touchy position advancing Islamabad's hobbies in Washington at the season of receptacle Laden's passing, brings up charming issues about what really happened in Abottabad.
In a greatly talked about 10,000-word London Review of Books article, Hersh reported that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence office (ISI) was harboring canister Laden for a long time before a Pakistani defector strolled into the American international safe haven in Islamabad and surrendered the area of al Qaeda's pioneer in return for a large portion of a $25 million US compensate.
The strike, Hersh claims, was not an one-sided secret operation. Rather, it was completely upheld by Pakistan's armed force leader, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, and the leader of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha — however simply because the US debilitated to uncover that they'd been shielding canister Laden on the off chance that they didn't cooperate.Biden (L), alongside individuals from the national security group, get a report on the mission against Osama container Laden in the Situation Room of the White House, May 1, 2011.
This story, Haqqani claims, "verges on dream," since in the previous minister's perspective, Hersh offers no practical clarification for why Pakistan's officers would oblige the strike without needing a credit for their part.
"On the off chance that a reserved alcove arrangement had been arranged to secure Pakistani participation in the attack on Abbottabad consequently for US hush, the ISI would have requested some heavenliness for its collaboration," Haqqani composes. "Encouraging the assault, as described by Hersh, would have given Pakistan's military and ISI a chance to vindicate themselves in American eyes."
My guidelines were clear"
Haqqani accentuates there is no proof that the ISI thought about the container Laden assault.
"Nothing in the behavior of Generals Kayani and Pasha (both of whom later constrained me to leave as minister) implied at their plot with the US in the Abbottabad assault," Haqqani composes.
He likewise contends that Kayani and Pasha were humiliated and needed to "guarantee that there would be no backlashes against Pakistan over affirmations of authority complicity secluded from everything container Laden."
That is the place Haqqani's extraordinary position became an integral factor. He says he was en route back to Islamabad when the assault happened on May 2, 2011, and his bosses sent him back to DC promptly to do harm control.
"My directions were clear: to guarantee that the US government, Congress, and the media did not point the finger at Pakistan's administration, military, or insight administrations for permitting Osama canister Laden's vicinity in the nation, as that would have been an infringement of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373," Haqqani composes. "My supervisors, both regular citizen and military, were clearly worried that Pakistan would be berated."
So who harbored canister Laden?
Haqqani surrenders that it is clear somebody in Pakistan shielded container Laden from 2006 to 2011. The inquiry is whether container Laden's defenders were working inside of Pakistan's administration and security administrations — and assuming this is the case, which piece of it.
Hersh, as far as it matters for him, refers to the work of New York Times reporter Carlotta Gall, who wrote in March 2014 that, as indicated by a Pakistani official, "the United States had direct proof that the ISI boss, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, knew of Bin Laden's vicinity in Abbottabad."
This week, Gall composed that she "gained from an abnormal state individual from the Pakistani knowledge benefit that the ISI had been concealing container Laden and ran a work area particularly to handle him as an insight asset."Haqqani says he asked for a full investigation into for what valid reason Pakistani knowledge administrations were not ready to discover canister Laden in its own particular patio. He never heard back. In any case, he includes that the Obama organization did not push Islamabad to answer addresses about receptacle Laden's life in Pakistan.
Haqqani infers that "the disappointment of both Washington and Islamabad to reveal a more finish comprehension of what happened in the years paving the way to the attack" prompted conspiratorial stories like Hersh's.
While it would be useful for general society to think about container Laden's bolster organize in Pakistan, Haqqani keeps in touch with, it "may not be in either Islamabad's or Washington's enthusiasm to wake resting mut
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